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On n'ecrit pas pour se montrer; 
on ecrit pour disparaftre. 
-B. Pinguad 
My presence here to talk about the seductiveness of literature 
is itself probably an effect-however distorted-of seduction, in-
sofar as I felt no particular desire to do so, having never previously 
even thought of speaking or writing about such a subject. Yet as 
soon as it was suggested to me I felt somehow "taken." And this is 
precisely how seduction works; as Baudrillard says, there is never a 
subject which desires an object, but rather an object which captures 
a subject. 1 
This essay was the keynote address to the VT National Congress of the 
Associazione Italian di Anglistica (A. I.A.) held in Pavia, October 22-24, 1983; it 
has been published in the Proceedings: T. Kemeny, L. Guerra, and A. Baldry 
(eds .), Letteratura & Discourse Analysis (Schena: Fasano di Puglia, 1984), pp . 25-42. 
[Translated from the Italian by Anne B. McLaughlin] 
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What was it then that captured me in this suggestion? I would 
say quite simply the chance I was being offered to reflect for a 
moment (naturally, with all the subjectiveness which this entails 
and which I would like to state right from the start) upon some-
thing which in our daily work as critics, historians, teachers (alas!) 
of literature we almost always tend to ignore, that is, the appeal or, 
if we prefer, the seductiveness which literature exerts upon us - as 
readers first and foremost, and only secondly as critics, historians, 
teachers, etc. 
A proof of what I have just said, somewhat casual perhaps but 
no less symptomatic, could be found in the symposium "Profes-
sing Literature" which the Times Literary Supplement published 
about a year ago (10/12/1982). In this symposium all the participants 
discussed critical methods, authors' canons, academic curricula , 
etc., without anyone's ever asking what a reader looks for in litera-
ture, what he finds (or doesn't find), in other words, why he reads. 
And yet there would be no methods or canons, or teachers or 
students (not even congresses such as this) if no one read, that is to 
say if no one, at some time or another, had ever been seduced by 
literature. It is this seduction, this experience of literature, which 
constitutes the presupposition for every subsequent discussion 
about literature. It is a kind of primal scene which we are constantly 
reliving even if we do not refer to it in our daily work, even if we can 
forget it or refuse to acknowledge it- a kind of indelible "residue" 
which never ceases to accompany us and perhaps at times to 
disturb us. 
What enticed me about the suggestion made by my friends on 
the Committe e was, then, the chance to approach this difficult and 
tenebrous core of literature. And when I began asking myself what 
angle I should approach it from, the only plausible answer seemed 
to be from the point of view of reading; because it is in reading that 
literature works its charm and its seduction on us; it is the form 
which gives us our original experience of it. My talk will therefore 
be a talk about reading. 
1. READING 
I will take as my starting point Ruskin's lecture Of Kings' 
Treasuries (1864) which, as you know, is about reading. 
There are two metaphors, apparently antithetical but in fact 
homologous, which dominate Ruskin's talk. The first compares 
reading to a social act, to "talk." Reading, says Ruskin, is talking 
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with those "friends" who are the authors of the books. As Des-
cartes had already said two hundred years earlier, "Reading a good 
book is like talking with those very great men of former centuries 
who were the authors." 2 
In fact, the term "talk" seems inappropriate. Talking involves 
an exchange of communication between someone who speaks (in 
this case, the author) and someone who replies (the reader). It 
always implies a dual relationship and it requires both parties to 
participate equally actively (even if perhaps at different levels). 
This, however, is not what Ruskin intends. His "friend" is a 
teacher, and the communication is one-way: the reader must sim-
ply listen silently to the voice of the author. Ruskin repeats this 
several times: the reader must not add anything of his own to what 
the author says; he must not allow his own thoughts and words to 
interfere with the author's. The reading relationship is therefore 
univocal: the reader must remain passive before the author, par-
ticularly since in the author's voice it is the voice of Truth itself 
("Nature's dictation" 3) that speaks. The reader's silence is the 
required condition for receiving the author's message, and the 
transparency of the reader before the author is doubled in the 
author's transparency before Truth. (This is what Proust rightly 
calls Ruskin's "Platonism.") 
Ruskin goes on to add a second metaphor for reading: reading, 
he says, is a type of work like that of "Australian miners." The 
truth which the reader extracts from a book is the gold which the 
miner digs out of a mine. 
Initially, this latter metaphor does not seem to accord with the 
former one. Not only because reading is shown as a solitary act, but 
above all because it is shown as an activity. To dig out gold, freeing 
it from the rock which imprisons it, we need spades, shovels and 
picks, or rather the "care, wit and learning" of the reader. If the 
book is a message of Truth, reading it will be a deciphering more or 
less lengthy and difficult, according to how cryptic the inscribed 
Truth is. 
When we look more closely, however, this second metaphor 
can accord with the first. The excavation involved in reading is by 
no means an interpretation of the Truth. The gold-like the "wis-
dom" of the friend-teacher-is there, it is given once and for all 
and it only requires to be brought to the light by breaking away the 
rock which imprisons it. "Rocks," for Ruskin, are the words in 
which the "thoughts," or rather the "intention" of the author has 
been deposited 4; but "rock" is also everything which constitutes a 
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screen for the reader, separating him from the gold. If the reader 
has to chip away at something, therefore, it is himself. In breaking 
up the rock, he will indeed use his "equipment" of care, wit and 
learning, but he will use it against himself, so to speak-until the 
moment when he has used it all up and he finds himself bare-
handed before the gold. In fact, he will find itin his hands-and he 
will come out of the mine with it, returning to the world a rich man , 
just as the disciple came back from a talk with the master bringing 
that "wisdom" he had acquired from him. 
The metaphor of the mine, however, is significant above all for 
the way it represents the experience of reading. Reading is self-
segregation. Like the miner, the reader leaves behind him the 
"outside world": other men, his place among them, his own (old) 
ego. Certainly, he leaves them behind to find them again, to 
recreate them by re-forming them differently from before (what 
better symbol of transformation than gold?). But is all this true? 
Will the miner really be able to come out of the mine with the gold? 
At a certain point in Ruskin's lecture, there is an astonishing 
passage. Wishing to distinguish what he calls "books of the hour" 
from those which he calls "books of all time," he says that the 
difference lies in the fact that, while the intention of the former is 
"communication," that of the latter is "permanence." The "book of 
the hour" is nothing more than the amplification - the "multi-
plication" and the "conveyance"-of the voice of the author, who 
writes it (in the same way as he writes a letter) only because he 
cannot reach all his (potential) listeners with the spoken word: if he 
could, he would not write. 5 On the other hand, the " book of all 
time" -which Ruskin calls the only true Book-is differen t be-
cause "it is essentially not a talking thing, but a written thing. " 6 
Now, what does this mean? 
One answ er comes to mind immediately. Ruskin, in the man-
ner of Horace and Johnson, is contrasting the lasting with the 
ephemeral. The "book of the hour" is ephemeral because it is poor 
and can be immediately deciphered, and therefore the communica-
tion between it and the reader is very quickly exhausted; the "book 
of all time" (the Book of Truth!), on the contrary, is lasting because 
it is rich and therefore requires a long, indeed infinit e effort on the 
part of the reader to decipher it. 
This is, however, a banal answer which confines itself to a 
conception of the book (and of reading) as communication , and 
this does not correspond to Ruskin's own idea in this particular 
passage. In fact, after reserving the term "communication" for the 
"book of the hour" and defining the "book of all time" as "not a 
, 
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talking thing but a written thing," he adds that it is very difficult to 
understand it because the author cannot express all his thought 
there. Indeed, even more strange, he does not wish to, either, choos-
ing to express it "in a hidden way and in parables." "I cannot quite 
see the reason of this," adds Ruskin, "nor analyse that cruel reti-
cence in the breasts of wise men which makes them always hide 
their deeper thought. " 7 
This is frankly an astonishing admission. First of all, reading is 
presented to us - following the communicative example of 
conversation-as listening to words; now, instead, these same 
words are being presented as reticent, indeed as an explicit, volun-
tary refusal to communicate. And such a refusal appears to be 
intrinsic to writing, constitutive of the very act of writing. To write 
is not to wish to communicate, or at least to remove something from 
communication. But what is the reason for this? Ruskin's answer is 
to some extent obvious: because "wisdom" is a reward which the 
reader must deserve. Gold can only be the recompense for the 
efforts made to find it. But it is clear that the question simply 
repeats itself: why must the gold be sought in this way? Why, 
instead, can it not be freely offered, donated? And here Ruskin has 
no reply-except to refer to the inscrutable laws of Nature. 8 
It is surely easy to imagine the direction which a discussion 
starting from this sentence of Ruskin's could and should take. It is 
the direction which has been followed, in the twentieth century, by 
a certain philosophical current, from Heidegger to Levinas, from 
Blanchot to Derrida right up to the recent book by Giorgio Agam-
ben, II linguaggio e la morte, 9 which has questioned the status of 
writing in its relations with language and with what we usually call 
(what Ruskin at any rate called) "Truth." (Needless to say, this was 
a question which lay beyond Ruskin's possibilities, so that in the 
end he was obliged to admit that he "did not understand.") 
I do not intend, however, to take this direction. I will instead 
keep, as I have done up to now, to the most superficial level of 
reading. At this level, Ruskin's lecture (undoubtedly going beyond 
and perhaps despite its author's intentions) brings us to an unex-
pected conclusion: the descent into the mine, which the act of 
reading consists of, may perhaps not bring to the light the gold 
which is to be found there, but may rather lead to the darkness of a 
rock which remains (as Nietzsche said) to some extent unbreaka-
ble, impenetrable. What had initially seemed like the silence of the 
reader listening to the voice of Truth, now appears to be a silence 
which, at least partly, sinks into another silence: the author's 
refusal to speak, and, behind this, the invisibility of a Truth which 
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(if it exists) is neven given entirely, neither to be known nor to be 
communicated. 
As we know, Ruskin's lecture was translated into French by 
Proust, who accompanied it with a long preface and even longer 
notes. 10 Proust immediately rejects Ruskin's equation reading= 
talking. Reading a book, he says, is not like talking to a friend; and 
the difference does not lie so much in the greater or lesser "wis-
dom" of one or the other, as in the different type of communication 
which they give rise to. Reading, says Proust, is "communicating 
in the bosom of solitude" and books, "the work of solitude," are 
the "children of silence" -"children" who have nothing in com-
mon with the "children of the word." 11 Unlike conversation, read-
ing 
consists for each of us in receiving the communication of another 
thought, while nevertheless remaining alone, that is, continuing to 
enjoy the intellectual power one has in solitude and which talking 
often dissolves, continuing to be able to be inspired, to remain in the 
full and fertile work of the spirit on itself. 12 
The difference between Ruskin's (first) type of reading, a 
public and social act, and Proust's, a private and solitary act, is 
obvious here. But it is not conclusive. After all, it was Ruskin 
himself who compared reading to a descent into a mine. The real 
divergence lies in Proust's rejection of Ruskin's "Platonism." Truth 
is not something already established outside of ourselves and 
which we must simply come into possession of-the wisdom of 
the friend-master, the gold of the mine-but rather something 
which we must find inside ourselves, indeed produce by ourselves. 
Thus Proust says that the experience of reading is an experience of 
"intellectual strength," of "fertile work of the spirit on itself," and 
in another passage he adds that the reader "develops his ego" 
thanks precisely to solitude and in it. 13 Here we see the distance 
between Proust and Ruskin: for Proust, the work in the mine is not 
a dissolving of the ego, on the contrary, it is a strengthening of it. 
The gold is not found but produced. If the written word (and 
therefore neither for Proust the spoken word) allows the reader to 
attune himself to the voice of the author, 14 that tuning is also what 
will allow him to find his own voice- which will allow him, there-
fore, to become an author himself. As Roland Barthes rightly 
noted, reading for Proust is-and must be-an inducement to 
writing. 15 
On the other hand, throughout these pages of Proust, there is 
also an insistent warning of a danger in reading. "Reading lies on 
the threshold of spiritual life; it can lead us to it, it does not 
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constitute it." The book is "the angel which flies away as soon as 
the gates of the celestial garden are opened." Reading is dangerous 
if, instead of "giving us the use" of our spiritual activity, it becomes 
a substitute for it. Then "stillness" takes over from "exaltation," 
the "principle of death" from the "principle of life," and that Truth 
which can only be drawn out of ourselves, created by ourselves, is 
sought outside, like a "material thing placed between the leaves of 
a book," a treasure already given which we have only to appro-
priate. 16 
This is certainly still part of the anti-Platonic argument; but 
there is more, which Proust does not dwell upon, which I, on the 
contrary, would like to emphasize-which, in fact, I will take as the 
leading thread of my talk. 
In a lecture on the education of young girls, Of Queens' Gardens 
(1864), which was also translated and commented upon by Proust, 
Ruskin condemned the "sore temptation of novel reading": "The 
best romance," he wrote, "becomes dangerous if, by its excite-
ment, it renders the ordinary course of life uninteresting, and 
increases the morbid thirst for useless acquaintance with scenes in 
which we shall never be called upon to act.'' 17 This is an old cliche 
which even in Ruskin's time had more than a century of history 
behind it (Coleridge had said that girls' reading of eighteenth-
century novels was just a form of daydreaming). However, it is 
worth underscoring the last words quoted, "scenes in which we 
shall never be called upon to act." When Ruskin denies that read-
ing novels can be educational for women, insofar as what a woman 
looks for (and finds) in them is only "food" for her "inborn disposi-
tion" to fantasy, 18 he is not simply repeating a commonplace on 
feminine identity; instead he is saying that reading seduces to the 
extent that, by removing the reader (the female reader!} from the 
"ordinary course of life," it leads to an imaginary world and iden-
tity. Reading (novels) is losing oneself to reality by losing oneself to 
oneself. 
It is precisely this oblivion and this loss which Proust shies 
away from in reading. His whole discussion is intended to 
state-with a still quite Romantic fervor (as can be seen in the 
recurrence of such terms as "inspiration," "creation," "genius," 
etc.)-that reading (and particularly the reading of novels) is a 
process of appropriation and not of expropriation of the self. What 
Proust resists and reacts against is the possibility that reading 
might be the devil of night who brings darkness into the daylight 
rather than the angel of night who brings light into the darkness. 
And yet, what if in fact this were the effect produced by 
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reading, the seduction that literature exerts? If, through/beyond the 
imaginary in which reality dissolves itself, it were that annulment 
of the self and of the world, rooted in an "inertia of the will," in an 
"impossibility to wish" that for Proust is a sickness, one which 
reading should cure by strengthening the self? If what the reader 
seeks within the space of a book were not the splendor of an ego 
but, on the contrary, the obscuring of "every sentiment and mem-
ory," like "that gentleman who, having lived from his earliest 
youth with street brigands, could no longer remember his own 
name because he had stopped using it for such a long time"? 19 
2. THE SECRET 
Ruskin and Proust have given a series of indications, some-
times convergent, sometimes divergent, which should now be tied 
together. Then we may try to define the effects of the seduction 
that literature exerts through reading. 
Etymologically, "to seduce" means "to divert," "to lead 
aside." If literature seduces, therefore, it is because it diverts the 
reader from what is nothing other than what Ruskin had called 
"the ordinary course of life" and Freud, more synthetically, "real-
ity." Reading is where this leading aside, this abduction takes 
place. Ruskin tells us so in his image of the mine, as does Proust not 
only in his insistence on solitude but in his list of places for reading: 
the shade of a tree in a deserted field, an empty room, the bedroom 
at night. ... These are experiences we have all had and we could 
add an infinity of others: for example, that during childhood we 
often read secretly, that equally often we are possessive about what 
we read: we do not like to talk about it, we hate to be caught in the 
act of reading, etc. Reading is an "asocial" experience (Barthes), 
"claustrophilic" (a term recently proposed by Elvio Fachinelli), 20 
which segregates us from the world and from other people-but 
also, we have begun to see, from ourselves. In a word, we might 
say that it is a movement toward secrecy, toward the space of a 
secret. 
Such a movement would seem to be governed by two tenden-
cies which I will call imaginary appropriation of the self and the world 
and expropriation of the self and the world. 
Starting from the first, I will rather liberally make use of two 
different theories: Lacan's famous study of the mirror stage, and 
some other psychoanalytic studies on secrecy and secrets which 
have appeared relatively recently. 21 
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Given that all psychoanalysts who have studied the secret 
(understood as the act of hiding [oneself in] something, not as what 
is hidden) agree in considering it an indispensable element in the 
mental constitution and organization of the subject, how do they 
represent it? The answer is simple: by comparing it to a treasure. 
Hiding is storing treasures. But what does one hide, and why? 
One hides above all, obviously, beloved objects which the 
subject stores as treasures to preserve them from appropriation by 
others, from the wear and tear of time, from loss in everyday life. It 
may be a gift, a letter, any very ordinary material object; or it may 
be a thought, a memory, an image, which becomes invisible by not 
speaking about it, not communicating it. But at the same time what 
the subject hides and treasures is a part of the self, the part bound 
to those beloved objects and which the subject feels as his own true 
identity, his own true self. 22 
As for why one hides oneself by hiding something, an English 
psychoanalyst (M. Masud R. Khan) has said that the subject "ab-
sents himself" (A. Green) in the secret not only to preserve his own 
self from a traumatic reality, but to keep it "suspended." The 
"secret('s) space," in other words, is a "potential space" (Win-
nicott) where the subject preserves those nuclei of mental experi-
ences which he does not yet have the capacity to actualize in the 
real world: he keeps them in the hope of being able to actualize 
them one day when he will (re-)emerge as a complete person in the 
world of (other) men. The secret, like a casket, guards the subject's 
identity in a utopian expectation of being able to give back to the 
sociality of real life. 23 
Let us compare what we have just seen with reading as it was 
presented, indeed recommended, by Ruskin and, above all, 
Proust. The correspondences are immediately clear. Precisely since 
it is solitary (self-hiding), reading allows the subject to go down 
into those "deep regions of the self" where "the true life of the 
spirit begins" 24 : where, by thinking "by himself," he can find and 
develop those forces which will make him an individual a part 
entiere: a "creator," says Proust. 25 For Proust too, then, the "secret('s) 
space" is a potential space: by absenting himself in that "sus-
pended animation" 26 which is reading, the subject preserves and 
indeed matures his own virtualities. To read is to be born, or rather 
to be continually reborn. By segregating the ego, reading reconsti-
tutes it again each time other than what it was . (Obviously, Rus-
kin's metaphor of the gold and the mine says nothing different 
from this.) 
However, this conclusion overlooks, in my opinion, an essen-
tial aspect of the secret. The process of segregation is a process of 
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transformation into fantasies. What is hidden (treasured) is trans-
formed into something (a treasure) imaginary. Any common 
phenomenology can confirm it. The more the beloved object is 
made and kept secret, the more it will lose its real characteristics to 
take on others which are purely imaginary. At the same time, that 
part of the self which the subject hides with the beloved object 
becomes imaginary too. If it is his true identity, his true ego, this 
identity and this ego are nothing more than a fantasy. Un leurre, 
Lacan would say. 
The imaginary, in fact-as Lacan himself teaches-is voue au 
leurre: to illusion and deceit (and therefore to disillusion and unde-
ceive). We can think back to one of the most frequently recurring 
themes in fairy-tales: a safe is opened, and instead of gold coins, 
stones or pieces of coal are found; a locket is opened, and instead of 
the lock of hair , a little heap of dust is found. Now, what else can 
this mean except that the treasure was imaginary - and that there 
is no way of converting the imaginary into the real? This is not all: 
the subject who discovers such a thing often goes mad. After 
having been closed inside the safe or the locket, his ego is dissolved 
when these are opened, finding himself without an ego. Again, 
there is no passage from the imaginary to the real. Segregation is 
irreversible. What has been closed in the "potential space" of the 
secret can never come out of it to be actualized in the real world. 
The utopia of the imaginary is truly a u-topia: something which can 
dwell nowhere but can only rest on itself: a pure and absolute 
fantasy. 
If the angel of reading, as Proust said, opens the gates of the 
celestial garden, it must be the garden of the imaginary; and if the 
reader's ego lives in it, this same ego is by now no more than an 
imaginary ego. As Barthes wrote, "the subject-reader is a subject 
entirely transferred into the register of the Imaginary." 27 And it is 
Proust himself who confirms for us that this register is not conver-
tible, reversible into the register of the Real: because that identity 
which he found in the silence and the solitude of reading is not his 
own identity, but Marcel's, such as will be presented in the 
Recherche. One passes from reading to writing, from one imaginary 
setting to another, without ever being able to come out and to 
return to the "world outside." 
It is here, then, that Lacan's theory of the mirror stage can help 
us. The essential point of this theory is well-known: between the 
age of six and eighteen months, when he is still in a state of motor 
unco -ordination and functional fragmentation, the child who is 
placed in front of a mirror perceives himself as a whole form 
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(Gestalt). That is, he perceives in the image the mirror sends him 
and in which he recognizes himself, that corporal unity, that func-
tional synthesis which he does not actually have but which, 
through such means, he is able to anticipate imaginatively. The 
child identifies himself with his mirror-image, and this comes to 
constitute for him the primordial form of what will one day be his 
"function as subject," the unity and the permanence of his ego (je). 
But such an identification is also, immediately, an alienation. The 
figure which is shown in the mirror is other than the child, so that 
by identifying himself with that, he identifies with the other of 
himself. At the same time, then, that the image provides the child 
with the symbolic matrix of subjectivity, it provides him with it as 
an object (moi) placed "in a fictional direction": an "Ideal -I" 
("ideal," like that corporal unity which the child in his real "pov-
erty" lacks) which constitutes an imaginary goal toward which the 
subject will never cease to stretch out, alienating himself in it. 28 
This experience of the mirror is exactly the same as the experi -
ence of reading. "Populated solitude," Proust called it: populated 
by figures, by images. Things, people, places, feelings, actions ... 
the whole of reality, reflected in the pages of a book, of books, is 
exhibited like a spectacle before the reader's eyes. And when the 
reader sees it, he recognizes it, that is, he identifies with it and 
alienates himself in it at the same time. I need not mention the 
identification processes which occur in reading. Whatever their 
form, it is always a projection of the subject who is reading into an 
"Ideal-I" which is the pole around which the work's entire imagi-
nary universe is arranged. The child's recognition of himself in his 
mirror -image, writes Lacan, 
immediately rebounds [ ... ] in a series of gestures in which he 
experiences in play the relation between the movements ass1;1med in 
the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual 
complex and the reality it reduplicates-the child's own body, and 
the persons and things around him. 29 
By taking possession of himself imaginatively, the child takes 
possession imaginatively of the world (his world). But as this world 
is also other than the real world, the child will alienate himself in it 
in the same way as he alienated in the other ego which the mirror 
sends back to him. The same thing happens with the reader: by 
coinciding with the imaginary ego provided by the text, he makes 
his world coincide with this equally imaginary world of the text. 
The pleasure of reading (which is something different from 
Barthes's "pleasure of the text") is therefore the "jubilation" of 
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Lacan's child in front of the mirror: it is the jubilation-or the 
"euphoria" (Barthes)-of the transfer to an ego and an imaginary 
world which leads the subject to believe that at last he possesses 
himself and reality. Qubilation and euphoria in which psy-
choanalysts will easily trace the dream of infantile omnipotence 
and its narcissism.) 
Ruskin, therefore, was right: segregation in the mine is aimed 
at finding gold: the gold of the imaginary. But precisely because it is 
so it cannot be carried out of the mine: it is a treasure only as long 
as it stays in the mine. I repeat, there is no exit from the 
1magmary. 
But here we must ask: is it necessarily true that we want to 
come out? Further still: is it really the gold we are looking for when 
we go into the mine? Or is it that we go in only in order not to come 
out again? Is not the gold only the lure which draws us into the 
mine, the alibi which we give ourselves for going in, at the most the 
"secondary gain" (Freud) which we obtain from it-whereas deep 
down what we are seeking is something else? In short, is not the 
reader Rosso Malpelo rather than Ali Baba?* 
Let us go back to the secret. The psychoanalysts who have 
studied it are ready to recognize that it is ambivalent: it can be a 
treasure, but it can also be a guilt feeling or a disgrace. Curiously 
enough, however, after having mentioned this, they go on to 
speak of it always and only as a treasure, never as a guilt feeling or a 
disgrace. 
Now, it is clear that this second value of the secret puts us in a 
completely different perspective. A guilt feeling or a disgrace is 
hidden not to be treasured but to be destroyed. We keep quiet 
about it, we make it invisible not because we want to preserve it but 
because we want to make it disappear. Nor do we wish it to remain 
out of sight only from other people, but also from ourselves. It 
should no longer exist even for us, even as a memory or an image. 
This is to say that we do not want to remember it, but to forget it. 
(The fact that guilt or disgrace remains as an indelible memory 
which keeps coming back to torment the subject is something 
against which he will never stop struggling.) This means, how-
ever, that it is the subject himself who wishes to forget himself. Far 
from guarding a part of himself in the secret, he rubs out this part, 
he suppresses it. "He carried his secret with him to the grave" is a 
*Rosso Malpelo is the main character of the homonymous short story by G. 
Verga, published in the volume Vita dei campi (1880). Rosso never returns from his 
exploration of the cave. [Tr.] 
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common expression: it is like saying that the secret was already the 
grave in which the subject had buried himself. 
Now, this annulment of the self is the second and more pro-
found goal of reading. More profound, I say, than the goal of the 
imaginary. Psychoanalysts draw an accurate distinction between 
"secret" and "fantasy." The fantasy is the signifier of a signified 
which remains unsaid. In every subject, fantasy production is a 
series of mobile and changing scenes which refer to an "other 
scene" -the secret-which, immobile and always identical to it-
self, remains invisible. Masks of a face which they hide. If the secret 
is an unspoken word, no other word can take its place, can trans-
late it-and by translating, reveal the secret. On the contrary, 
every (other) word, every image or fantasy cannot help but refer to 
the secret and annul itself in it-just as masks are annulled in the 
face which gives the lie to them. 30 
The relationship between fantasy and secret is the relationship 
which runs between the two tendencies and goals of reading. If the 
segregation from the real is supposed to achieve an imaginary 
appropriation of the self and of the world, what the subject is 
looking for-or rather, what he is seduced by-through/beyond 
such appropriation is the expropriation of the self and of the world. 
Not the identification with an imaginary ego, but the effacement of 
the ego. Beyond the fantasies lies the secret. What seduces us in 
literature - in the etymological sense of the word, what diverts us 
from ourselves-is the promise of that loss. The imaginary is only a 
lure and a transition. The gold which attracts us into the mine is the 
"call" (leurre) which induces us to go in; but what we are really 
looking for, what we have been seduced by, is the mine itself. As 
the Narcissus myth illustrates so exemplarily: because what he 
really desired, beneath the image of himself which was drawn on 
the surface of the water (his imaginary ego), was the bottom of the 
pool. The imaginary is the call of death. 
Proust was right, then, when, fearing reading, he said that it is 
scored by a dangerous "principle of death" which wishes and 
looks for "stillness." In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) Freud 
introduced a new principle called the "Nirvana principle," which 
was borrowed from an English psychoanalyst and, earlier, obvi-
ously, from Schopenhauer. With it, Freud was referring to the 
tendency of the psyche "to reduce, [ ... ] to eliminate the internal 
tension caused by stimuli." 31 In this text, Freud identified the 
Nirvana principle with the pleasure principle itself, in that he 
considered that pleasure could not be anything other than the 
opposite of tension. Four years later, in his essay "The Economic 
Problem of Masochism," he would seem to have changed this 
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view, contrasting the pleasure principle, representative of the 
libido, to the Nirvana principle, defined as "entirely in the service 
of the death instincts, whose aim is to conduct the restlessness of 
life into the stability of the inorganic state" and whose function it is 
to preserve the organism from "the demands of the life in-
stincts."32 
It is precisely under the sign of stillness and Nirvana-and of 
that death instinct of which they are, in Freudian terms, the rep-
resentatives, or, in Proustian terms, the angels-that the second 
goal of reading lies. If the pleasure which it brings is, above all, the 
jubilation of a subject who transfers himself-and possesses 
himself-in an imaginary ego and world, that pleasure, on a 
deeper level, is the happiness of a drift in which the subject flows, 
losing himself beyond the images themselves. Much has been said 
in recent years about an eroticism in reading. I would instead speak 
of it as an annulment of eros, of everything that can lead us back to 
exaltation and to life. 33 Behind the mirror of the images, dissolving 
the fantasies of the desire to which these images gave form, read-
ing attracts us and urges us toward that place where there is 
nothing more to desire because there is quite literally nothing. Or 
rather, only Freud's "inorganic state." Or rather, the rock in 
Ruskin's mine: rock with no gold left: mine which has closed in on 
itself. 
3. SEDUCTION 
If this is the ultimate goal of reading, it seems reasonable now 
to ask ourselves what textual strategies activate it. It is clear that the 
discussion about reading must at some stage double into a discus-
sion about the text. (The same way as in Barthes the distinction 
between the pleasure of the text and the enjoyment of the text 
corresponds to the distinction between text for pleasure and text 
for enjoyment.) This will allow a further clarification of the concept 
of (literary) seduction: this time a parte obiecti. And since this con-
cept was introduced by Baudrillard, we must refer to him. 
Baudrillard uses two definitions of seduction alternately and 
not very precisely. On the one hand, he defines as seductive any 
"intransitive" surface which does not refer to any depth below it, 
but instead withholds the eye in itself and makes it circulate among 
its forms (for example, make-up, fashion, games, ceremony, etc.). 
If a reference is made to something other than the appearance, it is 
only a simulation produced by the appearance itself-as in the 
trompe-l'oeil (which is Baudrillard's standard example), where 
three-dimensionality is simulated by two dimensions. 
GIUSEPPE SERTOLI 105 
On the other hand, however, Baudrillard states that the seduc-
tive mechanism "retracts something from the order of the visi-
ble,"34 it produces-or rather, it bases itself upon an "eclipse of 
presence." 35 The surface includes the "shadow" areas-invisible, 
unspoken-and these are the priming areas for seduction. Baudril-
lard then goes to great length to deny that the "shadow" which is 
drawn on the surface corresponds to a "back" of that surface: 36 the 
appearance is not perforated but simply obscured, and the fact that 
the "shadow" is mistaken for a "back" is only the deceit (leurre) 
which seduction consists of (as the trompe-l'oeil example shows). 
I do not intend to discuss this theory here. I cannot help 
pointing out, however, that I find it more suggestive than 
convincing-a verbal artifice of the same tenor as the "superficial 
abyss" formula which Baudrillard adores. 37 Not only does he con-
tinually presuppose that very depth he denies when he is explain-
ing the seduction mechanism, 38 but in all the examples he offers 
(the only exception being perhaps the trompe-l'oeil) this depth does 
play a part. To prove this, we need only look at erotic seduction 
(model for every other form of seduction): Baudrillard goes to great 
length to separate it from sexuality-from desire and 
enjoyment-whereas in actual fact it consists of and exists only in 
reference to that sexuality. That is, in the reference to something 
which is other than it and lies behind it. 39 
I would consider important, instead, the emphasis placed on 
the shadow, on the invisible and the unsaid. It is not what is 
offered to the eye which is seductive, but what is removed from it. 
As Barthes said (without, however, using this term), a striptease is 
not seductive but the unbuttoning of a blouse is. 40 What is seduc-
tive is that which cannot be perceived and deciphered-within a 
context of perceptibility and decipherability. 41 "Seduction," writes 
Baudrillard, "is always what outrages the visible universe [ ... ] in 
order to overturn it into a secret; what seduces is something which 
contains a great secret." 42 (I would note, by the way, that the 
dimension of depth comes out again in these very words. It may 
well be, in fact-as Baudrillard adds immediately after-that what 
is seductive is "what contains" the secret and not "what is hid-
den''; but ''what contains'' the secret is seductive insofar as it refers 
to "what is hidden" as to something other than itself.) 
If this is seduction, it must be carefully distinguished from 
fascination. The contradictoriness of Baudrillard's theory derives 
from his having confused the two concepts. 43 Though I don't have 
the time (nor indeed would it be the appropriate place) to attempt 
to elaborate on this, I will simply point out that everything Baudril-
lard writes about appearance pertains to fascination, not to seduc -
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tion. Fascination is the abrupt halt before an impenetrable surface. 
It i·s the experience of pure, absolute visibility, the experience of a 
flat shape devoid of all depth. What is fascinating, then, is every-
thing which is pro-duced in the exact sense in which Baudrillard 
uses the term: "brought to visibility. " 44 Everything which does not 
contain a secret. 
Seduction, on the contrary, begins precisely where the secret 
begins. Where the surface of the visible, of the said, bends over and 
sinks into a whirlpool which sucks in the subject (spectator or 
reader) toward something which is-and must remain-hidden. 
Baudrillard is perfectly correct in saying that the true secret is the 
one which remains such, which (since it is different from the 
enigma) cannot or must not ever be revealed. 45 But precisely for 
this reason it seduces: because it makes the subject experience a 
feeling of vertigo which projects him outside of himself. 
It is clear that we are not far from the discussion on reading 
already developed. The two goals of the imaginary appropriation 
of the self and of the world and of their expropriation correspond, 
in fact, to the experiences of fascination and seduction-two ex-
periences which are both textual strategies. The literary text fasci-
nates in that it offers the reader a surface of shapes, of figures over 
which his eyes can run (and I need not add that the more the 
surface of the text is perfected, the more it will fascinate, as in the 
well -known example of entertainment literature). And since fasci-
nation is always an identification (-alienation) in the image dis-
played, the reader will appropriate to himself what the surface of 
the text shows him. The text, on the other hand, seduces to the 
extent that, by referring the reader toward "something" which it 
does not show him, toward a sense which is always removed from 
him, it attracts him into a void which expropriates him of his 
knowledge and of his very identity. 
I foresee the objection that this void, the obscure depth of the 
text, is precisely what gives rise to analysis and interpretation , 
which are anything but an expropriation of the subject. But I would 
reply that with analysis and interpretation we are already at a 
different level, subsequent to that reading. Analysis and interpre-
tation are indeed the re-affirmation of the ego of the reader, who 
has become critic, against the seductive effect produced in him by 
the text and consisting, I repeat, of an eclipse of the ego- as the 
page from Ruskin which I quoted at the beginning illustrates so 
well. When, faced with what he called the "cruel reticence" of an 
author, Ruskin confessed to "not understanding," he was register-
ing perfectly (even if, certainly, involuntarily) the seductiveness 
that the author had exerted on him. A bewilderment-to adapt 
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Barthes's words to Ruskin 46 -which had unsettled his historical, 
cultural and psychological assumptions, the consistency of his 
taste and values, upsetting not only his knowledge but his very 
relationship with language. The experience, in short, of a loss 
of self. 
Someone may still object that the sensation of vertigo when 
faced with the secret to which the text refers is something different 
from the instance of drift which I mentioned above with reference 
to reading. It seems to me, instead, that, as erotic seduction is the 
activation of a desire in the subject who is seduced, so the secret 
contained in the text activates in the reader precisely that tendency 
to annul himself of which I have spoken and without which, 
perhaps, he would not even read. 
I would like to add one last thing. To say that the most seduc-
tive texts are those which most include a layer of things left unsaid 
undoubtedly sounds obvious today. But it is something obvious-
like all the emphasis on analysis and interpretation which accom-
panies it-which remains inside that myth (or ideology) of pro-
duction so well illustrated, as far as sexuality is concerned, by 
Foucault in La volonte de savoir and against which Baudrillard him-
self has written so effectively. According to this myth ( or ideolog y), 
literature is born from a wish to say all. One writes in order to say 
everything. And if one does not say it, it is because one is not able, 
because something prevents communication. Reticence, then, is 
only the obstruction of the word, the unsaid , the interdiction of 
something which asks only to be said, the secret , the effect of a 
censorship (internal or external) .... Indeed, it is not even correct 
that one cannot say (almost) everything; one can-obliquely, 
through symbols and enigmas, through tropes and lapsus-which 
analysis and interpretation will then undertake to solve, to trans-
late into direct language, to communicate, using an inquisitorial 
procedure for which the psychoanalysts who have studied the 
secret have rightly used the expression "sublimated sadism." 47 
Nothing must remain unspoken and hidden, every dark corner 
must be lit, one must confess the unconfessed (or have it con-
fessed), display the repressed, denounce the ignored .... Hiding is 
an anathema, and silence is a curse. 
And yet, what if we were to begin looking at literature (also) 
from the opposit e point of view? In a recent book, The Genesis of 
Secrecy (1979), Frank Kermode took as his starting point the "scan-
dalous" verses of the Gospel of Saint Mark (4:11-12) (verses which 
Ruskin certainly had in mind when he wrote the passage quoted 
above) in which Jesus says that he speaks in parables in order that 
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those who "are without" may see but not perceive, hear but not 
understand, "lest at any time they should be converted and their 
sins should be forgiven them." In order that they should not per-
ceive and und erstand, in order that nothing should be communi-
cated to them! Kermode's book then carried on in a different 
direction and did not really center on this tendency toward secrecy 
and silence. But it is a central feature in the author who is quoted 
perhaps more than any other in that book: Henry James. Several of 
James's stories are built around a secret: not around a variety or a 
depth of meaning such as we find in all the great authors , but 
around something which is intentionally not said and must not be 
known-a kind of "black hole" around which the constellation of 
the text rotates. They are stories which can mainly be defined as 
meta-narratives , since they dramatize the act and the status of 
writing, but which we could also define as "meta-seductive," since 
what they present is precisely the effect of seduction which litera-
ture, through the secret it contains, exercises over the reader. 
Predictably enough, critics have unleashed their "will to know" on 
these stories: it was compulsory to reveal the secret, to make the 
silence speak - where what James was evoking was the exact op-
posite: the function that hiding and keeping silent have for litera-
ture, and without which literature would not even exist, because 
then it would be (as Ruskin had said) a "talking thing" and not a 
"written thing ." 
Communication in the bosom of silence is what Proust called 
reading. Why not say, instead , that literature is silence in the 
bosom of communication? Not the language of silence, but silence 
in language (that is, in the only place where it is possible). Litera-
ture's appeal lies in this rejection of communication and displa y. 
Psychoanalyst s will see in it the protection of the subject's identity. 
Why not see, rather, the desire for its disappearance? So much has 
been said (spoken, as always) of the liberating function of literature . 
. . . Why not suppose, at least, that if it liberates us from something, 
it is from ours elves? 
EPILOGUE 
This is, in my opinion - but I should really say, in my 
experience-the heart of the literary experience. The rest comes 
after-and the "rest" is criticism, which begins with "knowing 
how to read," with Barthes's "pleasure of the text," 48 and then 
continues with hermeneutics and with historico-cultural recon-
structions. At these various levels, criticism is always a compromise 
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(in the sense in which Freud spoke of "compromise-formations") 
between our ego and the world we go on living in, on the one hand, 
and the experience of literature in the process of reading, on the 
other. Criticism is a return of the ego to itself, which submits to its 
own pow ers of recognition and control that text which, for a 
moment, had made it come out of itself. It is a defensive strategy 
against the seductive force of literature, and as such it is regulated 
by the principle of reality, not of pleasure and /or death. 
I hope it is clear that I say all this without any derogatory 
intention. Criticism is something we all do, which I myself do. It is 
not a futile or useless exercise, or only a job which we are paid for. 
Criticism gives us an awareness of the literary fact, of its historical 
and cultural collocation, of the functions it performs each time, of 
the values it produces and reproduces, of the rules which govern it . 
. . . But the knowledge of a fact is not the experience of it. 
If I may take up the metaphor of the mine again for the last 
time, the critic seems to me to be like the mine engineer who, after a 
preliminary study of the land, digs a well and the tunnels, provides 
ventilation and safety systems, and if he goes into the shafts, it is 
only to put a prop here, a beam there, a vent somewhere else -
something quite different from going alone into the darkness of the 
earth. And yet this going-in is what constitutes the experience of 
the mine. 
Similarly, criticism is the drilling and the exploitation of litera-
ture, the extraction of what the "world above" defines as the gold 
of knowledge. But this work and its proceeds remain outside of 
that for which I can find no other name except, once again, the 
experience of literature. The critic is Rosso Malpelo who has come 
back among men , and has perhaps become manager of the mine. 
Perhaps it was impossible for him not to come back-but if he 
forgets "what it was like in there," if he does not use it as a t:onstant 
reference point for his every choice and action, then he might as 
well change his job. 
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